Note: Ironically, I embraced C. S. Lewis's position on "preconceptions" when I wrote Stubborn Credulity. As I wrote in the subsequent "Insuppressible Fallacy-Mongers," "I believe that, in the early days at least, [Lewis] inadvertently did atheists a favor" (2). On that point, Michael Martin appears to have agreed with me. In his comments on Lewis, he wrote, "Lewis's position, if accepted, would perhaps do more to undermine the argument from miracles than any naturalistic critique of this argument" (Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1990, 193). What then was Lewis's position? As Martin put it, "in order to assess whether miracles exist, it is first necessary to decide between naturalism and supernaturalism" (Ibid, 192). For reasons cited in my books, I have gravitated towards Lewis's position. Martin, however, disagreed with Lewis; so it's essential that we take into account what he said. According to Martin, "Lewis is certainly right to suppose that in considering the question of whether miracles exist there is a danger that one will appeal to a priori arguments and assumptions. But the solution to this problem is not to decide on naturalism or supernaturalism beforehand. Rather, one must attempt to reject the a priori arguments and instead base one's position on inductive considerations" (Ibid, 193). I conjecture that Martin's position is actually more commonplace than Lewis's. As I wrote years ago, "laymen don't generally think that regardless of what happens nature is all there is" (See below).
I am tempted to borrow Martin's idea concerning nature^b (nature in its broadest sense) and nature^n (nature in Its narrowest sense), but I am uncomfortable with the inclusion of supernatural beings in nature^b (Ibid, 190). I do, however, think that the term broad naturalism could be an appropriate one for my views. The term narrow naturalism, on the other hand, could be used to label the a priori assumptions that Martin taught us to resist.
In any discussion about labels, It's cliché to bring up the Hobbes quote "Words are wise men's counters; … but they are the money of fools." We can expect Christian apologists, who should know better, to say that naturalists are no different than Hume's Indian prince. The Indian prince refused to believe in frost or ice because It was contrary to nature or, more accurately, contrary to his narrow and limited experience of nature. I am tempted to label such an attitude narrow naturalism. I don't believe that many people who identify as naturalists are narrow naturalists. I think most naturalists simply believe, as Michael Shermer articulated it, "There is no such thing as the supernatural or the paranormal. There Is only the natural, the normal, and mysteries we have yet to explain." A person who agrees with Shermer would not have to deny the existence of something commonly referred to as "supernatural" or "miraculous" if he had compelling empirical evidence for the phenomenon. To borrow an idea from economics, naturalism can be a "filing system" (Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics"). Someone who uses a different filing system is not analogous to the incredulous prince.
In the piece that follows, I am afraid that I was under the impression that one of my targets had the mindset of Hume's Indian prince. If so, my conclusions are suspect. Keep that in mind while reading.
"People have to choose between science and faith…" (Strobel 2004, 11) These are the words of an angry parent distressed about the textbooks that were used in public schools. Presumably, he wanted his child to be sheltered from science. Assuming that he is a Christian, it is understandable why. Religion, according to Carl Sagan, "has been scarred in its confrontation with science." (Sagan [1979] 1980, 331) Science, according to Keith Parsons, is "unavoidably naturalistic - atheistic if you prefer." (Moreland & Nielsen [1990] 1993, 129) The legendary scientist Albert Einstein testified, "Through the reading of popular scientific books I soon reached the conviction that much in the stories of the Bible could not be true." (Pagels 1982, 21) (Another source reads "…much of the stories of Bible could not be true." (Sagan [1979] 1980, 29)) [redacted] seemed to be echoing Parsons when he wrote that science "addresses only naturally occurring phenomena and thus, by definition, excludes consideration of the supernatural." ([redacted] 2006, 154) This sentiment, especially when worded like that, has been controversial among not just believers but atheists as well. Some may agree and will say, as the concerned parent essentially did, "Down with science." Others may be more cool-headed and will understand that the supernatural is not considered in scientific inquiry because "transcendental explanations are, by definition, nonnatural; they cannot be confirmed experimentally; they cannot be corroborated objectively." (Kurtz 2003, 284) If [redacted] is really saying that scientists cannot consider the supernatural doesn't that sound close-minded? Victor Stenger might have thought so; he had misgivings about the assertion that "science deals only with the natural." He called this position dogmatic. Furthermore, he didn't think it was accurate:
[T]he naturalism of science is methodological and not necessarily ontological. If the evidence for nonnatural causes is there, as many theists are now claiming, then scientists will proceed to examine that evidence fairly and openly, that is, by submitting it to the glare of the scientific method. While naturalism has proven to be a useful working assumption in science, and economy of thought demands that all natural causes be exhausted before adding new assumptions, scientists have no emotional or dogmatic attachment to the assumption. Show them the data. Most would be thrilled if a whole new world opened up to explore by empirical means. (Stenger 2003)
When [redacted] said that science doesn't consider the supernatural perhaps he meant, merely, that supernatural causes "are ruled out for philosophical as well as practical reasons." (Kurtz 2003, 111) If so, this position is also problematic. If you rule out supernatural causes you'd have to rule out supernatural events. If you rule out supernatural events how is this different from philosophical naturalism? A philosophical naturalist, according to C. S. Lewis, believes that "nothing exists except Nature" and that the word nature means "everything" or "the whole show". (Lewis [1960] 2001, 6) This position cannot be disproven; its major drawback is that it contradicts common parlance concerning the supernatural. Certainly, laymen don't generally think that regardless of what happens nature is all there is. Common parlance is more consistent with Stenger's position. According to him,
If a phenomenon can be found that dramatically violates a number of the most basic principles of physics - energy conservation, causality, relativity - we might be permitted to make a tentative hypothesis of the existence of transcendent reality beyond the realm of natural phenomena, and then try to see if it works … It's not difficult to think of events that could be classified as supernatural with a reasonably high degree of confidence. They simply have to violate those principles of physics confirmed and elaborated upon by centuries of careful observation. If we can show that some solid physics principle is violated in ways that cannot be understood as extensions beyond its realm of applicability, we will have made a good start toward demonstrating the existence of the miraculous. (Stenger 1990)
Even atheist Dan Barker has written that he would believe in God (the supernatural) if "Jesus would materialize in front of a debate audience, captured on videotape, and if he were to tell us exactly where to dig in Israel to find the ark of the covenant containing the original stone tablets given to Moses." (Barker 2008, 76)
Perhaps [redacted] believes that science only addresses natural phenomena because "supernatural explanation is outside of what science can deal with." (Kurtz 2003, 111) If so, this view puts limits on science. Furthermore, if true then why does Stenger think that scientists would be anxious to explore this new realm? If the supernatural cannot be investigated using the scientific method then scientists would have difficulty (to say the least) verifying any of their hypotheses about it.
Concerning miracles, [redacted] wrote that "all miracles … are faulty perceptions based upon gaps in cause-effect understanding." ([redacted] 2006, p. 96) While this may be a necessary basis for these perceptions it is not a sufficient one, as [redacted] appears to have grasped later in his book. According to C. S. Lewis, "Unless there exists, in addition to nature, something else which we may call the supernatural, there can be no miracles." (Lewis [1960] 2001, 5) Like Lewis, the classical apologists "see the need to first establish that this is a theistic universe in order to establish the possibility of and identity of miracles." (Geisler [1999] 2012, 30) [redacted] agreed that belief in the supernatural is a necessary condition for belief in Divine miracles: "[O]ur perception of what is, and what is not, a Divine 'miracle' is prejudicially determined by what we already believe about God's nature. Witnessing 'miracles' … does not evoke belief in God. Rather, belief in God evokes the witnessing of 'miracles'." ([redacted] 2006, 165 & 166)
By making a distinction between "miracles" and "Divine miracles" [redacted] avoids an apparent inconsistency. [redacted] based a large chunk of his book on analyzing the former kind. Ultimately, however, there are no miracles but Divine ones. If we assume that "creationists" and believers are the same people then [redacted] is giving us two different reasons they believe in miracles. The two reasons are ignorance and prior belief in God. Ignorance may be the proximate reason but the ultimate reason is anterior belief in God. It is unclear whether he thinks belief in God is a necessary condition. Originally, he gave us no indication that belief in God was a prerequisite for believing in miracles. He wrote,
In the chapters that follow (presumably, 4, 5, & 7), we shall explore why creationists routinely perceive miracles where none exist. We shall see how creationists, like children at a magic show, create their own miracles by failing to observe and understand scientific cause-effect relationships.
When he concluded chapter 7, he signaled that his inquiry on miracles was complete: "Thus, we end this section of the book where we began several chapters ago (Chapter 3) - with a 'God of the Gaps.' For whenever human knowledge is incomplete, God is hastily recruited to fill the vacuum." ([redacted] 2006, 84 & 168) As a positive statement this rings true. However, [redacted] is no longer contending here that the incompleteness of knowledge is the cause, ultimately, of belief in miracles or God as he seemed to be saying earlier in his book. The cause of belief in miracles is, in the last analysis, belief in God.
As emphasized, this was the position of prominent Christian apologists. According to George H. Smith,
Some theists define ('miracle') as divine intervention in the natural course of events. This definition presupposes the existence of a god … [I]t requires that one first believe in a supernatural being before one can believe in a miracle… (Smith 1979, 211)
Comments