"Forget the Old Bluffer"

Christian apologists regularly teach variations of the principle "Nonbeing cannot produce being." According to my notes, the late Norman Geisler taught precisely that (The Big Book of Christian Apologetics, 2012, 70 & 106). Interestingly, the once-famous unbeliever Charles Bradlaugh also taught that "out of nothing nothing can come [ex nihilo nihil fit]" (Gordon Stein, ed., An Anthology of Atheism and Rationalism, 1980, 11). Bradlaugh was a man of the nineteenth century. The notion of an expanding universe, from what I gather, wasn't on anyone's mind at the time. As I wrote in Stubborn Credulity, the universe "is not 'static,' as it was believed to be in the nineteenth century" (29). According to Victor Stenger, before Einstein, "everyone thought the universe was a static firmament, as described in the Bible" (God and the Multiverse, 122). As I mentioned in the previous blog posts, the Kalam Cosmological Argument has existed for at least several centuries. The premise "The universe began to exist" existed long before Einstein. Today, however, apologists and theologians can use relativity (See Bertrand Russell, The ABC of Relativity, Third Revised Edition, Mentor, 1969, 111) and the Big Bang Theory to prove that the universe began to exist. One apologist--perhaps the most prominent one--who uses the Big Bang to argue for the Kalam argument (from this point, KCA), William Lane Craig, actually conceded, "[S]ome people find philosophical arguments dubious or difficult to follow; they prefer empirical evidence" (Reasonable Faith, Third Edition, 125). I will argue that apologists need philosophical arguments since Big Bang cosmology alone doesn't support the claim that the universe "popped into existence from nothing"*

As I mentioned in a previous blog, one of the philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past is premised on the assumption that an actual infinite cannot exist. To see why I don't accept that premise, see Stubborn Credulity or the blog post "Unreasonable Faith?". In Stubborn Credulity, I conceded the premise for the sake of argument, but as I observed elsewhere, the fallback position is one that even an atheist could very well have trouble with. One atheist who had no problem with time having a beginning was the forgotten author Dühring. We know about him and his work because Frederick Engels wrote an entire book attacking him. Engels asked two important questions:

"What was there before this beginning of time?"

"If the world had ever been in a state in which no change whatever was taking place, how could it pass from this state to a changing state?"

I believe I've written enough about the second question. If the universe is static, then there are (at least) two ways that time could begin:

1. Immobile matter transitions to a mobile state.

2. Matter pops into existence from nothing.

Whether Engels was wrong to decry the first way, he at least understood that the beginning of time presented the atheists of his day with a problem. Even so-called "low-brow atheists" (William Lane Craig, Apologetics, 1984, 58) seemed to have a problem with the Big Bang well into the twentieth century (See John Murray & Madalyn O'Hair, All the Questions You Ever Wanted to Ask American Atheists, Second Edition, Austin: American Atheist Press, 1986, 36 & 37). Perhaps, the American Atheists were under the impression that the Big Bang supported the theistic view, which they described quite eloquently:

At the root of it all, we think now, is an incorrect assumption that there was a time when "nothing" existed. This is a so-called period of "void," before the subsequent "creation" of all natural things, of what you call "something." The religionists, such as yourself, must have this "nothingness" period in order to justify a then-necessitated omnipotent creator. (John Murray & Madalyn O'Hair, All the Questions You Ever Wanted to Ask American Atheists, Austin: American Atheist Press, 1986, 32)

"Nothing" evidently means no natural things. The universe would mean all of the natural things. O'Hair is basically saying that the theologians sneak God into the proceedings. "Nothing" essentially means "only God". The philosopher Michael Scriven conceded that such a scenario was possible: "[I]f we mean by 'the Universe' just the material things which make it up ..., then it is conceivable that these things all come from some nonmaterial entity such as a God or a magnetohydrodynamic vortex" (Primary Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, 1966, 115).

Regarding conceivability, Graham Oppy asked, "[W]hy is [the criterion of conceivability] good enough here [in the case of a changeless and timeless God], and yet not in the case of the supposition that something might exist uncaused?" ("Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Religious Studies, 27, 196). Mere conceivability would permit a Godless scenario just as easily as it would permit the contrary. As Quentin Smith noticed, "I can conceive the possibility of the universe beginning to exist uncaused. This uncaused beginning may be utterly astonishing, but it can be conceived to possibly occur, unlike a blade of grass simultaneously being both green all over and red all over" ("A Big Bang Cosmological Argument For God's Nonexistence," 1992 <https://infidels.org/library/modern/quentin_smith/bigbang.html>).

The apologists evidently are relying on "ex nihilo nihil fit." As I wrote in Stubborn Credulity, the late R. C. Sproul reportedly taught that "if there was ever a time when there was nothing, there would be nothing now." Perhaps uncharitably, I rebutted,

The phrase "if there was ever a time when there was nothing" is incoherent. Literally, it means "if there was ever a time when there was no time". Physicist Sean Carroll recognized that people misconceived when they conceived of a time when only nothing existed: "The problem with 'creation from nothing' is that it conjures an image of a pre-existing 'nothingness' out of which the universe spontaneously appeared--not at all what is actually involved in this idea. As human beings embedded in a universe with an arrow of time, we reflexively attempt to explain events in terms of earlier events, even when the event we are trying to explain is explicitly stated to be the earliest one. It would be more accurate to characterize these models by saying 'there was a time such that there was no earlier time.'"

Admittedly, what Carroll and other physicists were proposing was a bit mind-boggling. At the risk of confusing you even more, I'd like to share some old notes on this subject. Trust me when I say that there is a payoff at the end:

It shouldn't trouble us if we can't understand the mysteries of existence; this should be expected. As psychologist Steven Pinker explained, "If the mind is a biological organ rather than a window onto reality, there should be truths that are literally inconceivable, and limits to how well we can ever grasp the discoveries of science." The strange idea that "time came into existence with the Big Bang" just makes our heads hurt the more we ponder it. Question like "What lies beyond the edge of the universe?" just lead to more questions (Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 2002, 239). Are scientists claiming here that "the total" or "the cosmos" came into existence or had a beginning; not just the universe we inhabit? If so, then they are denying the existence of God, or at least a God that existed before the Big Bang. As Father Copleston observed during his debate with Bertrand Russell, "if the total has no cause, then ... it must be its own cause..." (Al Seckel, ed., Bertrand Russell on God and Religion, 1986, 130).

What I wish to focus on is the claim made by Father Copleston. I think he's wrong. When people say that God is uncaused, do they mean He is self-caused? We need context before we can determine what someone meant by "uncaused". The word "uncaused" is ambiguous. I know it's cliché to say that the context matters, but here the context really does matter. Coming to be in time is one thing. Coming to be with time is another thing. The late Norman Geisler told a story that implied the difference didn't matter:

One of the fundamental rational laws of all thought ... is that every event, everything that comes to be, has a cause. Now if the universe came to be then it's only rational to conclude that the universe had a cause. Let me illustrate by a story of two men, an atheist and a theist, who went for a walk in the woods. They came on a translucent glass ball about eight feet in diameter, and the theist said to the atheist, "Where did it come from?" He said, "I don't know, but someone must have put it there. It didn't just pop into existence out of nowhere." They both agreed. The theist said, "But if the ball was sixteen feet in diameter, does it still need a cause?" "Well, little balls need causes. Big ones need causes, too." "What if the ball is as big as the whole world?" The atheist pauses and says, "Yeah. If little ones need causes, then big ones need causes, and really big ones need causes, too." Then he says, "What if the ball is as big as the whole universe?" The atheist said, "Of course it doesn't need a cause. It's just there." That's not rational.

Geisler's opponent, Paul Kurtz, shrewdly declared, "I deny the notion that the universe came into being ex nihilo, out of nothing."** Indeed, I don't see why atheists must deny "ex nihilo nihil fit". Apologists might insinuate that they do, but even the atheist in Geisler's story, as we'll see, isn't guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The most obvious objection to Geisler is that, unlike some ball, the universe was at some point a microscopic object. Even the fictional character who is quoted in the title of my post understood that: "As you know, … inside the Planck length and the Planck duration you have this space-time foam where the quantum fluctuations from matter to non-matter really have very little meaning …. [Y]ou get this bubble of broken symmetry that by negative pressure expands exponentially, and in a couple of microseconds you can have something go from next to nothing to the size and mass of the observable present universe" (John Updike, Roger's Version, 1986; New York: Random House, 2013, 314).

It may be simply unintelligible to talk about a cause for the universe. As Quentin Smith explained,

[A]s for [William Lane Craig]'s final remarks, if atheists believe the universe is uncaused then it popped into existence. Well, I spent the whole night explaining this theory that says that the universe did not pop into existence without a cause. The universe does not have a cause. Everything in the universe has a cause. This didn't pop into existence uncaused, it was caused by that. That didn't pop into existence, it was caused by that. So there is nothing that lacks a cause and since everything is caused by some other part of the universe, there is nothing in the universe that lacks a cause, therefore there is nothing that needs God for its cause. I mean, what theists need to show - what is it that God needs to cause to exist? Everything that exists has a cause. And if you add God to it, what did God do? If God exists, he was already caused to exist by some other part of the universe. That's not what God is though.*

It may seem that Smith is expounding upon the familiar "infinitely old Universe," but, as we'll see, he is not. He has recently been writing about what Michael Scriven referred to as the Universe "which has an infinite history but a finite age." Lest you think he is falling into contradiction, let's acknowledge that "even if we concerned ourselves only with small numbers, notions of 'infinity' would crop up":

Consider a series of fractions like this: 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, 1/32, 1/64, 1/128, 1/256, 1/512, and so on endlessly. Notice that each fraction is one-half the size of the preceding fraction, since the denominator doubles each time.... Although the fractions get continually smaller, the series can be considered endless because no matter how small the fractions get, it is always possible to multiply the denominator by 2 and get a still smaller fraction and the next in the series. Furthermore, the fractions never quite reach zero because the denominator can get larger endlessly and it is only if an end could be reached (which it can't) that the fraction could reach zero. (Isaac Asimov, Realm of Numbers, 1959; Greenwich: Fawcett, 1967, 132 & 134)

What does this have to do with our topic? The phrase "fraction of a second" may give you a hint. "In an instant" makes one wonder what an instant is. There is no smallest fraction, but is there a smallest instant of time? The answer is both yes and no. Yes, empirically speaking. No, logically speaking. Again, Quentin Smith:

The Big Bang occurs at t > t^0. However there is not some instant at which the Big Bang occurs, for (assuming that time is dense or continuous) there is no earliest instant after the first instant t^0; for every instant t^a > t^0 there is another instant t^b < t^a. Accordingly, if the phrase "the Big Bang" is to be used unequivocally, it must be used to designate a state occupying an interval that is the first interval of some length to elapse after t^0. Although on a priori grounds there is no nonarbitrary basis for selecting this length, there are empirical reasons for identifying the first post-t^0 interval of length 10^-43 second as the time of the Big Bang. The earliest state of the universe that cosmologists have determined to be unpreceded by a state of a different kind is the state constitutive of the Planck era, which occupies the first post-t^0 interval of length 10^-43 second. ("The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, Mar., 1988, 45)

As mentioned, more recently, Smith has reconciled the Big Bang with an infinite history universe to develop a KCA for Atheism:

According to contemporary physical science, in particular, big bang cosmology, there is no first instant t = 0. If there were such a first instant, the universe would exist in an impossible state at this time; the whole spatially three-dimensional universe would occupy or exist in a point that had no spatial dimensions. Such a state of affairs would be described by nonsensical mathematical statements.

For example, at t = 0, the density of the universe's matter would be (to give a simplified example) of the form 25 grams per zero unit of space, that is, 25/0. But this a mathematically nonsensical sentence, since there exists no mathematical operation of dividing by zero. The alleged fraction 25/0 is not a number but merely marks on a page, since there is no fraction with zero for a denominator and a positive number for its numerator. The universe began to exist later than the hypothetical time t = 0.... An interval [of time] is half-open in the early direction if it has no earliest instant.... The first hour would be closed if the hypothetical first instant t = 0 actually existed. But since it does not exist, the first hour is half-open in the early direction.... If we "cut out" the instant t = 0 that corresponds to 0 in the interval 0 > x < or = 1, we will not find a certain instant that immediately comes after the "cut out" instant t = 0. For example, the instant y corresponding to the number 0.5 cannot be the first instant, since between the number 0 and the number 0.5 there is the number 0.25 and some instant z corresponding to 0.25. The same holds for any other number in the interval 0 > x < or = 1.... An interval is half-open in the earlier direction only if its beginning point is a singularity, that is, its alleged beginning point is in fact physically impossible and does not exist.... [T]here is no first instant of the universe's beginning to exist that is uncaused and that requires an external cause, such as God, to bring it into existence. ("Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism," The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed. Michael Martin, Cambridge UP, 2007, 185 & 196)

If you are unfamiliar with the term "singularity," that is fine. I bring it up here because I once found it strange when atheists would mention the singularity. By the nineties, Stephen Hawking maintained that a singularity didn't mark the beginning of the universe. The universe, according to Victor Stenger, "was never an infinitesimal point in space-time" (The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning, 2011, 125). "The laws of quantum mechanics ... forbid the infinities" (Kip Thorne, Black Holes and Time Warps, 1994, 476). I was under the impression that no singularity meant, arguably, no need for God (See the Hawking biopic The Theory of Everything.) If even a singularity doesn't point to God, then we can, in the words of a fictional "evangelical on behalf of nonbelief," "[f]orget the old bluffer [God]" (John Updike, Roger's Version, 1986; New York: Random House, 2013, 318 & 320).

If there are no singularities, then the universe's origin is a mystery. As Victor Stenger argued, we can never know what went on before the Planck time (Stubborn Credulity, 29). Because of the new developments in cosmology, I doubt that the fictional character whom I quoted in the title was correct about every detail. I do, however, believe that trying to bring God into the theoretical model isn't helpful. God, when grafted onto the model, is a way to abide by the axiom "ex nihilo nihil fit." At least, that is my tentative answer to Graham Oppy's question "How does God's existing 'changelessly and timelessly' differ from his coming into existence uncaused at the very moment at which time is created?" ("Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, Religious Studies, 27, 196). Even if we are confronted with what Michael Scriven called "the fully finite Universe [finite history and finite age]," we are just trading one mystery for another by bringing in God. Apologists want to make it seem that the concept is ridiculous or violates the just mentioned axiom so that it can be ruled out, but Scriven argued that "even the Universe of limited age does not come from nothingness, since there was no previous time and no empty space from which it could have come. It simply exists without having come from anywhere. And this will be true whether or not it has an inexhaustible history. So ... the Universe is a kind of entity that exists without coming from anywhere" (Primary Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, 1966, 122). Adolf Grünbaum, echoing Scriven, wrote,

[I]n what sense could an uncaused Big Bang universe be thought to have "come out of absolutely nothing"? Surely NOT in the sense that there existed moments of time before the Big Bang at which the physical universe did not yet exist but only nothing. As I argued …, despite the metrically finite past duration of the Big Bang world, there was no such prior time. Thus, the finitude of that past does not warrant the conclusion that if this universe is uncaused, it must have "come out of" a prior state of nothing.***

For the above reasons, I can without hesitation say that, until we have exhausted all other options, we should not resort to a disembodied mind who wields magic.

Even if we do need to resort to God, let's not pretend that God meshes well with the Big Bang. In the pre-Big Bang KCA, time could begin in any conceivable way. It just had to be finite. Post-Big Bang, however, "time itself is a result of the Big Bang" (Dan Barker, Godless, Ulysses Press, 2008, 133). The Big Bang, in some way, caused time, but in order to accept that, would you have to accept that a cause can be simultaneous with its effect? (Not quite. See George H. Smith on the universe being a "metaphysical primary" [Atheism: The Case Against God, Prometheus, 1979]. Likewise, Nathaniel Branden taught,

The universe is the total of that which exists…. Causality presupposes existence…. The universe … did not, at some point in time, "spring into being." Time is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes entities that move. If nothing existed, there could be no time. Time is "in" the universe; the universe is not "in" time. ["'First Cause' is Existence, not God" <http://www.skepticfiles.org/american/1stcause.htm>]

Sean Carroll, in his debate with William Lane Craig, said something similar:

[I object] to the language of coming into existence or popping into existence. That is not what the universe does even in models where the universe has a beginning, a first moment. Because the verb popping, the verb to pop, has a temporal connotation, is the word I'm looking for. It sounds as if you waited a while, and then, pop, there was the universe. But that's exactly wrong.

The popular author Sam Harris was also aware of this problem: "It is not clear that we can even speak coherently about the creation of the universe, given that such an event can be conceived only with reference to time, and here we are talking about the birth of space-time itself" [Letter to a Christian Nation, 2006, 73 & 74].) Isn't that confusing enough? Adding God to the situation makes matters more, not less, difficult. A questioner at the now legendary William Lane Craig-Sean Carrol debate spoke for me when he said,

I'd like to understand better the Kalam argument because I am struggling with this. You're stating that the universe has a beginning and then you invoke cause and effect. Cause and effect is a temporal concept; so if there's no time.... [Cause and effect] is a temporal concept. It makes sense if time exists. But before the universe, there's no time.... Why would you need a cause?... The cause has always to precede [the effect].

William Lane Craig responded,

I don't think that's true. Don't you think causes and effects can be simultaneous?... I think that's evident. God's creation of the universe is simultaneous with the universe coming into being. What can be more obvious than that?

Craig once wrote, "[H]e thereby exposes himself as a man interested only in an academic refutation of the argument and not in really discovering the truth about the universe" (Apologetics, 74). It's ironic, then, that he would be resorting to a concept that caused people to literally "struggle". Craig doesn't have much of a choice. He apparently endorsed the relational view of time (See William Lane Craig, "'What Place, Then, for a Creator?': Hawking on God and Creation," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41, No. 4, 478). According to this view, "there may be no meaning to time besides change" (Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos, Oxford UP, 1997, 286). The view is evidently the consensus view, at least among philosophers. If I'm not mistaken, the relational view can mix with the Big Bang and the principle that states that causes precede effects. When you throw God in to the situation and declare Him to be the first cause, you apparently have problems. The intuitive principle about causes preceding effects must go. Again, throwing Craig's words back at him, the principle that cause and effect is a temporal concept "is so intuitively obvious that I think scarcely anyone could sincerely believe it to be false" (Apologetics, 74). I think Sean Carroll had the above conundrums in mind when he, during the same debate, said, "[A]s a scientist, there is this enormous temptation that I am constantly resisting when I am in dialogue between science and theology which is that as theologians talk about the relationship between God and time, or God's status as necessary or anything like that, there's a big part of me that wants to say, 'Why are you working so hard to extract yourself from these dilemmas when you can just say God doesn't exist?'"

In his book Godless, the former preacher Dan Barker made some important points about causality. Craig is quoted as teaching that "the origin of the universe is causally prior to the Big Bang, though not temporally prior to the Big Bang" (quoted in Godless, 136). Barker dissented in part. Barker seemed to be saying that Craig's statement was an example of an a priori truth. Given what Barker wrote in the original version of the piece, my interpretation is virtually confirmed. The original version, still available online, reads: "(In logic we say that a conclusion 'follows,' though we do not mean this happens in space or time. Craig writes that 'the origin of the universe is causally prior to the Big Bang, though not temporally prior to the Big Bang')"**** Craig's proposition could be known through pure logic. In other words, the truth of the statement is known a priori and is, therefore, beyond dispute. It has nothing to do with what Hume called a "matter of fact". As Hume argued, "The contrary of every Matter of Fact is still possible" (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Ernest C. Mossner, New York: Washington Square Press, 1963, 36). "Matters of fact" or "judgments of experience" are, according to Immanuel Kant, "always synthetic" (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Philosophy of Material Nature, trans. James W. Ellington, Hackett, 1985, 13). Craig's statement is also, apparently, a synthetic one, as in synthesis or combination. Synthetic judgments involve two or more separate things. In the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explained, "[I]n synthetic judgments I must have besides the concept of the subject something else (X), upon which the understanding may rely, if it is to know that a predicate, not contained in this concept, nevertheless belongs to it" (Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St Martin's, 1965, 49). Craig's statement not only appears to be a synthetic a priori judgment; it is also a judgment about causality. A priori judgments concerning causal relations were referred to by Kant in a non-pejorative way as metaphysics (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Essays in Philosophy, ed. Houston Peterson, Pocket, 1959, 77). Metaphysics was controversial among many, if not most, twentieth century philosophers (The first chapter in A. J. Ayer's book Language, Truth & Logic was titled "The Elimination of Metaphysics"). Bertrand Russell also evidently believed that synthetic a priori was a "null set" (See my professor Bill Barnett and Walter Block, quoted in my pamphlet "Insuppressible Fallacy-Mongers"). If something is "causally prior" but not "temporally prior," then, according to Russell at least, the statement is analytic. Russell, in the debate that Barker cited repeatedly, said, "[T]o my mind, a 'necessary proposition' has got to be analytic" (Russell-Copleston debate, The Existence of God, ed. John Hick, New York: Macmillan, 1964, 169). Presumably, Barker agreed. Yet, he also agreed with Craig. What's going on here? I think that we need to check our premises. According to Hume, "We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori" (Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Essays in Philosophy, ed. Houston Peterson, Pocket, 1959, 77, underline added). Superficially, the universe is one thing, and the Big Bang is another thing, but Barker shrewdly wondered whether the universe was, indeed, a thing. He concluded that it wasn't: "the universe is not a 'thing'" (Godless, 141). Barker thus, arguably, avoids the controversy about metaphysics, if not the one about the synthetic a priori. More importantly, he undercut the KCA. The KCA states that

1. Everything that comes to be has a cause.

2. The universe came to be

3. The universe had a cause.

I won't object to the validity of the conclusion since there are more robust ways of stating the first premise ("Whatever begins to exist has a cause"). Barker, using a formulation almost identical to Norman Geisler's, noticed that something was missing. If one is going to use the word "everything," it is only fair if someone asks, "Is the universe a thing?" If it's not, then Geisler's "translucent ball" story is irrelevant. As Barker argued, it compares apples to oranges (Godless, 140).

Because the universe is not a thing, it's not clear if we can say that it has a causal relationship with something else. It is, therefore, questionable to use the universe to prove the simultaneity of cause and effect. In his writings, Craig mentions events such as "a ball denting a cushion" and "a locomotive pulling a train." Perhaps, these examples can be used to refute the principle about causes preceding effects. Adolf Grünbaum, however, rebutted that the first example "is predicated on the assumption that, prior to the ball's impact on the cushion, the dent was not present in the cushion. Hence we must consider the process which issued in that dent."***

The biggest problem with a cause being simultaneous with its effect was articulated by Barker. He wrote, "Without temporal succession, there is no way to determine the order of cause and effect" (Godless, 137). I think he's correct. For those who are unfamiliar with Hume, I'll mention here what I have mentioned elsewhere. Hume taught, "Now as all objects, which are not contrary, are susceptible of a constant conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary; I have inferr'd from these principles, that to consider the matter a priori, any thing may produce any thing, and that we shall never discover a reason, why any object may or may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them" (A Treatise of Human Nature, Second Edition, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1978, 247). As mentioned, Craig said that "God's creation of the universe is simultaneous with the universe coming into being." If the two events are simultaneous, then why couldn't the universe's coming into being cause God's creation of it? If we take Hume seriously, the question is unavoidable. I think that the universe's coming into being is simply a corollary of God's creation of it. Craig is mistaking a corollary relationship for a cause-effect relationship.

My speculation is that Barker, the atheist, was thinking that the universe "sets the foundation for causal explanation" (George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God, Prometheus, 1979, 240). In that sense, the universe is "antecedent" to events within the universe. "Causally prior" sounds like "prior to causes"; so it's understandable if people think that Craig is saying the latter. I don't think Craig meant that, but frankly, I don't know how else to make sense of his statement. Just based on what we've seen, it's not obvious at all that "causes and effects can be simultaneous." Interestingly, Craig, in the same debate, admitted, "Both the naturalist and the theist can be stubbornly committed to their worldviews and not allow contrary evidence to overthrow it. Naturalists are just as adept as theists at explaining away evidence that they find inconvenient.... That's a charge that I think cuts both ways." Isn't Craig, by denying that the cause must be prior to the effect, himself revealing how stubbornly committed he is to his theistic worldview?

Craig's words come back to haunt him in still another case. Craig champions the criterion "more plausible than its denial". I ask, "Is Craig's denial of Hume more plausible than its denial?" For those who are unfamiliar with Hume, he taught that "the cause should be prior in time to the effect" (T. Z. Lavine, From Socrates to Sartre, New York: Bantam, 1984, 160, emphasis added). Returning to what I just said, the universe's coming into being is a corollary of God's creation of it. Replace "God" with "naked singularity". According to Paul Davies, "the singularity should not be regarded as an object or a thing, so much as a non-place where all known laws are suspended.... [Stephen] Hawking has argued that, being an utterly lawless entity, a singularity should originate totally chaotic and random influences" (The Edge of Infinity, 1981, ix, 149, 150 & 169). We could say that the naked singularity's creation of the universe is simultaneous with the universe coming into being. The question, however, is not "What can be more obvious than that?" That's not the right question. The question is, instead, "What caused the universe to come to be?" If someone asked, "What caused the universe to come into being?," and you said, "God's creation of the universe," the questioner would wonder if you understood the question. On the other hand, saying that God is the cause is not enough. How did God cause it? God is said to have spoken the world into existence. I suppose it's conceivable that the speaking and the creating can be simultaneous. It's not the case that they must be simultaneous. What, then, is the cause of the speaking? Let's say it is God's eternal determination to speak the world into existence (See Craig, Apologetics, 93). If that is the cause, then cause and, therefore, time not only existed before the moment of creation, but also existed from eternity past. (Perhaps, there is a grain of truth in the assertion that "[a]ll cosmologies--whether secular or theological--are forced to contemplate an infinite regress" [David Mills, Atheist Universe, 2006, 237 & 238].) If the two events happen at the same time, one can always say that one caused the other. It's plausible that the two simultaneous events are both caused by God's eternal determination to actualize both events.

In Stubborn Credulity, I wrote,

[T]he theologians could rebut that it is not causality that they are concerned with, but change. Change, according to some, had a beginning. Prior to the beginning of change, nothing but a changeless, quiescent God existed―this God being an unembodied mind who is determined from eternity past to create the universe from nothing using will alone. I mention these teachings not to refute them but so that the reader will understand what, according to my understanding, he will have to resort to if he accepts the conclusions of theologians like Craig [et al]. (39)

If I'm correct in what I've written here, modern apologists have to bite another bullet. Of course, they would have their readers believe that unbelievers are the ones who have to bite the worst bullets. For example, the following quote from a philosopher named Anthony Kenny is available everywhere Christian books are sold: "According to the Big Bang Theory, the whole matter of the universe began to exist at a particular time in the remote past. A proponent of such a theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing" (quoted in Varghese, ed., The Intellectuals Speak Out About God, Geisler & Turek, I Don't Have Enough Faith to be An Atheist, etc.). The Scriven quote reproduced here is less well-known but is older than the Kenny quote.

In a book attributed to Antony Flew, we find the following sentences: "Modern cosmologists seemed just as disturbed as atheists about the potential theological implications of their work. Consequently, they devised influential escape routes that sought to preserve the nontheist status quo" (Antony Flew & Roy Abraham Varghese, There is a God, 2007; HarperCollins, 2008, 137). Apologists are no strangers to the "block universe" hypothesis. According to G. J. Whitrow, an author writing in the nineteenth century suggested that it is an illusion that "there is a three-dimensional world enduring in time." Instead, the author argued, "the world is a four-dimensional spatial manifold." Hermann Weyl, in the twentieth century, was of the same opinion. He wrote, "The objective world simply is, it does not happen" (quoted in The Natural Philosophy of Time, 1963, 293 & 308). Of course, the apologists and, I'm guessing, the public-at-large aren't too impressed with the "block universe". It's not a "live option". Regardless, time "starting and stopping is no problem for the block-universe picture, within which what's real is the history of the universe taken as a timeless whole" (Lee Smolin, Time Reborn, 2013, 74). Unlike some other physicists, Lee Smolin does not spatialize time. Even he, in an early book, could write, "[B]y definition the universe is all there is, and there can be nothing outside it. And, by definition, neither can there have been anything before the universe that caused it, for if anything existed it must have been part of the universe" (Three Roads to Quantum Gravity, emphasis added <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/19/books/chapters/three-roads-to-quantum-gravity.html>). To steal a phrase, the universe is "causally prior". According to Victor Stenger, "Not everything requires a cause" ("The Universe Was Created by Accident," Science & Religion, ed. Janelle Rohr, San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1988, 123). The question, however, remains: Is the universe a thing?

*Smith-Craig Debate (<http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-smith_harvard07.html>)

** John Ankerberg Show, "Secular Humanism - Part 1" (<https://youtu.be/a6PUhIP4fJk>)

***"Some Comments on William Craig's 'Creation and Big Bang Cosmology'" <https://infidels.org/library/modern/adolf_grunbaum/comments.html>

**** "Cosmological Kalamity," 2000 (<https://infidels.org/library/modern/dan_barker/kalamity.html>)